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ABSTRACT
The fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has raised a number of
questions over the future of the organization and the potential threat it
might continue to pose. While some commenters argue that the demise
of the Caliphatewill reduce ISIS’s global appeal, others have stressed the
role that jihadi supporters may play in perpetuating ISIS’s ideological
legacy. Yet, little is known on how supporters have responded to recent
changes in circumstances. Employing a cognitive dissonance approach,
this contribution examines the implications of ISIS’s defeat on twelve
jihadi supporters’ commitment. It shows that while a minority of sup-
porters have disengaged, the majority have remained committed to the
group. While these diﬀerences stress the inﬂuence of personal situa-
tional factors on supporters’ responses, the data at the same time
indicates that dissonance has preceded in some cases ISIS’s defeat.
The contribution overall shows that integrating cognitive dissonance
theory to the study of radicalization and terrorism can provide a more
nuanced understanding of how individuals renegotiate the nature of








The recent military defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has raised a number of
questions over the future of the organization and the potential threat it might continue to
pose. Originating from Al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS is a jihadi movement that rapidly spread in
Iraq and Syria in the early 2010s to establish itself as one of “the most dominant and
resourceful jihadi organizations” in contemporary history.1 Unlike other modern-day jihadi
groups, it has distinguished itself through its extensive reinvestment of prophetic traditions
predicting the revival of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the central role it will play in
instigating a new world order.2 Serving both as a marketing and recruitment strategy, it
sparked renewed support for global jihadism. As McCants observes:
References to the End Times [are] a big selling point with foreign ﬁghters, who want to travel
to the lands where the ﬁnal battles of the apocalypse will take place. The civil wars raging in
those countries today [Iraq and Syria] lend credibility to the prophecies. The Islamic State has
stoked the apocalyptic ﬁre. […] For Bin Laden’s generation, the apocalypse wasn’t a great
recruiting pitch. Governments in the Middle East two decades ago were more stable, and
sectarianism was more subdued. It was better to recruit by calling to arms against corruption
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and tyranny than against the Antichrist. Today, though, the apocalyptic recruiting pitch
makes more sense than before.3
Since the proclamation of ISIS’s Caliphate in June 2014, thousands of jihadi supporters have
traveled to Iraq and Syria to settle in ISIS territories and ﬁght alongside the organization. In
Europe, an unprecedented number of jihadi supporters have moreover expressed their
support for the group. More than ﬁve years later, ISIS has however lost most of the
territories it controlled. Its Caliphate, which expanded across Iraq and Syria and encom-
passed several provinces in Africa, Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, has collapsed
over the past years, leading to ISIS’s military defeat in March 2019.4 Most of its ﬁghters in
Iraq and Syria have died—including its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—and a large number
of surviving members are today waiting in Kurdish camps and Iraqi prisons for their fate to
be decided.5 With the exception of a few military achievements in its provinces over the
past year,6 ISIS’s dream to “remain and expand” seems to have come to a halt. Yet, some
commenters have warned of possible ways whereby ISIS may overcome its defeat and
continue to inspire a new wave of jihadists. In a study published in 2017, Nance and
Sampson, for instance, anticipated that “the destruction of ISIS will be a historical achieve-
ment, but the by-product will be a less centralized terror group that will rely much more on
inspiring terror attacks rather than planning them and deploying cells.”7 Yashlavskii has
similarly warned of “a possibility of [ISIS] militants’ relocation to diﬀerent regions of the
world both in conﬂict areas (Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, etc.) and other countries (not
excepting European countries and Russia). In this context, there is a real danger of foreign
jihadi ﬁghters returning to their home countries for sabotage and terrorist activities, as well
as for the creation of ‘autonomous jihad’ sleeper cells.”8 Through its reliance on digital
propaganda and encrypted apps, it is moreover believed that ISIS may continue to coordi-
nate attacks and to strengthen its support base until it can reclaim a new physical territory.9
These strategic debates overall stress the limited impact that a military defeat will have on
ISIS as a transnational jihadi movement and its support base. As McCants argues, jihadi
supporters “will continue to wage insurgencies, taking advantage of the political instabilities
and social unrests that gave rise to their statelet in the ﬁrst place,” with or without the
existence of an ISIS territorial foothold in Iraq and Syria.10
While these strategic debates stress the role homegrown jihadi milieus may play in
sustaining ISIS’s ideological legacy, little is known on how supporters have perceived and
responded to ISIS’s defeat. Yet, militant groups are not “free-ﬂoating” entities. As
Malthaner and Waldmann observe, they emerge from and operate within a speciﬁc social
environment which “shares [their] perspective and objectives, approves of certain forms of
violence, and (at least to a certain extent) supports the [groups] morally and logistically.”11
This supportive environment constitutes the backbone of militant groups’ campaigns. By
spreading militant groups’ ideology and mobilizing support, it contributes to militant
groups’ development and provides the necessary resources for their survival.12 Several
authors have moreover stressed the role that extremist milieus may play in the escalation
of violent conﬂicts.13 As illustrated by the waves of attacks orchestrated by ISIS-related
networks in Europe over the past years, supporters may actively contribute to the
orchestration of attacks and the perpetuation of violence. Given the role that supporters
play in militant groups’ campaigns, greater attention must be paid to how jihadi suppor-
ters have perceived ISIS’s defeat to anticipate future developments in the jihadi scene.
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Drawing on interviews with twelve participants from Belgium and the Netherlands, this
contribution examines the implications of ISIS’s military defeat on homegrown jihadi
supporters’ commitment. The term “homegrown jihadi supporters” refers in this study to
men and women who have shared—at least to a certain extent—ISIS’s perspective and
frame of reference. It includes individuals who have attempted to travel to Iraq and Syria,
have engaged in support activities in their home country and/or have supported the
establishment of an ISIS Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. The theoretical approach employed
in this study draws on cognitive dissonance theory (CDT), which is concerned with
cognition and behavior in context and is therefore well-equipped for examining how
individuals renegotiate their beliefs, behavior, and attitudes in relation to particular events.
After providing a brief overview of the CDT literature, this contribution outlines the
methods used for data collection, as well as potential methodological limitations. The
result section then examines how participants have cognitively and behaviorally responded
to ISIS’s defeat by outlining two main processes: (1) reaﬃrmation of ISIS’s belief system,
and (2) disengagement from ISIS’s belief system. The last section seeks to further interpret
participants’ responses by examining diﬀerences in their degree of commitment, their self-
concept, and their belief system. The article ﬁnally concludes by summarizing the research
ﬁndings and providing some brief recommendations for counter-extremism programs.
Research approach and theoretical framework
Questions as to how members of ideological groups respond to changes in circumstances
have extensively been addressed in the scholarship on CDT. First developed by Festinger
and his colleagues, CDT is concerned with how external, social and interpersonal factors
inﬂuence individuals’ cognition and behavior.14 Its focus is on personal and collective
processes whereby individuals and groups cope with discrepant cognitions. According to
CDT, discrepant cognitions arise when two or more elements of one’s knowledge, belief,
attitude, values, emotion, or behavior enter in conﬂict.15 This situation triggers feelings of
psychological discomfort—or dissonance—that individuals will be motivated to resolve to
bring their thoughts into greater harmony.16 Studies have shown that they will do so by
altering the cognition that is the least resistant to changes.17 This may, for instance,
require individuals to modify their behavior or attitude, to alter one of the conﬂicting
cognitions, or to introduce a new element in their belief system.18 Failure to reduce
dissonance will conversely sustain the negative cognitive state.
One of the most often cited examples of dissonance which interests us here is that
which arises from prophetic disconﬁrmation in particular and perceived threat to one’s
belief system in general. Generally deﬁned, prophetic disconﬁrmation can be described as
the non-happening of a predicted or expected event.19 This situation triggers dissonance
for those who have invested in the predicted event because it is dissonant “with continuing
to believe both the prediction and the remainder of the ideology of which the prediction
was the central item” and “with all the actions that the believer took in preparation of its
fulﬁllment.” Normally, this would mean to change our expectations or beliefs to bring out
thoughts into greater harmony. Yet, studies have shown that in most cases, individuals
tend to respond to prophetic refutation in a way that reaﬃrms their beliefs.20 According to
Festinger and his colleagues, “frequently the behavioral commitment to the belief system is
so strong that almost any other course of action is preferable [to admitting that one has
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been wrong] … It may even be less painful to tolerate the dissonance than to discard the
belief.”21 A prophetic disconﬁrmation may thus be reinterpreted as a test of faith, a human
error or a partial fulﬁllment of the prophecy. In some cases, individuals may conversely
respond to dissonance by abandoning the norms and values of the group. In their study
on the Bahá’ís Under the Provisions of the Covenant (BUPC), Balch and his colleagues for
instance found that while the most “genuine believers” had renewed their support to
BUPC in the aftermath of a prophetic failure, a majority of members had left the group.22
They concluded that individuals’ responses to disconﬁrmation were closely related to their
degree of commitment to the group. Overall, these studies stress two main adaptive
responses—or discrepancy reduction—to perceived threats to one’s belief system: indivi-
duals may either reduce dissonance by modifying some aspects of their belief and/or their
behavior so that it conforms better to reality, or they may conversely ﬁlter and alter reality
so that it conforms better to their belief system.23
Several studies have clariﬁed dissonance arousal and dissonance reduction processes by
examining the role of social processes and self-concept on individuals’ responses to discrepant
cognitions. Concerning social processes, Dawson has listed several factors that may inﬂuence
reduction processes. These include (1) the degree to which believers are socialized to the
prophetic process and expectations, (2) the degree to which members are motivated or
compelled to engage in costly preparations for the prophesized event, (3) the degree to
which leaders respond swiftly and thoroughly to apparent failures, and (4) the degree of
solidarity and social support present in the group.24 As he notes, these factors will vary from
group to group and from time to time. Studies that focus on self-concept have additionally
stressed the role of self-categorization on dissonance processes. Markus and Nurius deﬁne
self-concept as the mental representation that organizes perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes that
individuals have about themselves and the world.25 This self-concept is not ﬁxed but is
gradually redeﬁned as individuals move across social settings and social groups. Through
their interactions with the social world, individuals come to identify with particular social
groups and to internalize their representations of reality, which in turn contributes to shaping
their deﬁnition of the self and the world.26 According to the self-concept theory, the more
meaningful a social identity is for an individual, the more salient it will be to his or her self-
concept.27 Studies that focus on the relationship between cognitive dissonance and self-
concept posit that (1) dissonance will be particularly high when individuals experience
a threat to their self-concept, and (2) individuals will reduce dissonance in a way that reaﬃrms
and is consistent with their self-concept.28 McGregor and his colleagues have for instance
found a correlation between threats to self-integrity (self-concept), personal uncertainty and
dissonance reduction through authoritarianism, belief reaﬃrmation, and devaluation of the
out-group.29 In their study of counter-extremism programs (CVE), Day and Kleimann have
similarly shown that exposure to counter-narratives tends to produce a psychological “back-
ﬁre eﬀect” and pushes individuals toward further radicalization.30 The more individuals value
a particular identity, the more committed they will consequently be to reaﬃrm it when
confronted to perceived threats to their self-concept.
Given its focus on cognition and behavior, CDT arguably provides a relevant frame-
work for understanding how jihadi supporters have responded to ideological setbacks and
renegotiated the nature of their involvement in the wake of ISIS’s defeat. As a form of
conversion, involvement in extremism can be described as a progressive learning process
which involves both physical and cognitive aspects: through their socialization within an
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extremist milieu, individuals come to commit to an ideological and moral framework
which frames reality in a particular way, legitimizes certain modes of actions and con-
tributes to shaping their deﬁnition of the self and the world.31 In the case of ISIS, this
framework can be said to be “world-transforming” because it promotes the instigation of
a new social order which rejects dominant cultural values, beliefs, and institutions.32
Besides predicting cataclysmic changes, ISIS has also provided its followers with several
attractive incentives such as ultimate meaning, belonging, excitement, adventure, salva-
tion, as well as an opportunity to realize themselves in a meaningful way.33 According to
Dawson, there are therefore “strong incentives [for supporters] … to reinterpret the
seeming failure of prophecy as part of a larger plan, of a march towards eventual triumph
over the forces of evil.”34 Yet, no empirical study has so far applied a CDT approach to the
demise of the Caliphate, which constitutes the central focus of this study.
Methodology
The empirical material on which this contribution is based consists of semi-structured
interviews and electronic conversations with twelve ISIS sympathizers from Belgium and
the Netherlands. As previously mentioned, the term “sympathizers” refers in this con-
tribution to men and women who did not necessarily travel to Iraq and Syria but who
have been involved in supportive milieus sharing ISIS’s frame of reference. The interviews
were conducted between January 2018 and July 2019 as part of a broader research project
on the evolution of beliefs and behavior during involvement in Islamic extremism in
Western countries. The research sample included three women and nine men who were
between twenty and thirty years old. Two were “born-again” Muslims who had redis-
covered their faith over recent years and ten were converts. This section will further
elaborate on participants’ backgrounds and how they have been approached, as well as on
potential research limitations.
Participants’ recruitment and data collection process
In the majority of cases, participants were ﬁrst contacted through social media to take part
in research on the development of Islamic fundamentalist ideals advocating for far-
reaching changes in society. Although interviews were also conducted with individuals
who did not support armed jihad or had fought alongside other groups than ISIS, this
contribution solely focuses on participants who have supported the establishment of an
ISIS Caliphate. After initial contacts on social media, an interview was arranged with
participants at a time and place of their choice. Several topics were addressed during the
interviews. These topics notably included participants’ background, their process of (re)
conversion to Islam, their journey through extremism, their experience with jihadism, and
their views of the fall and future of the Islamic State. Electronic conversations were
additionally conducted with participants on encrypted applications to collect additional
data and clarify speciﬁc themes addressed during the interviews. Eight out of twelve
interviews were recorded, with participants’ consent, and transcribed shortly after the
interview. In one case, recording was not possible. Data was consequently transcribed
through notetaking. Due to geographical distance, three interviews were moreover con-
ducted through extensive electronic conversations and audio-recordings on Telegram, an
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encrypted electronic platform popular among jihadi supporters. All the interviews and
electronic conversations were coded with Atlas.ti and analyzed based on an inductive
approach which aimed at generating theory through methodical examination of the data.
Speciﬁc attention was paid to how individuals emotionally and discursively framed the
demise of the Caliphate and how they had responded to it. Given the fact that most
participants were monitored by authorities, only their country of origin will be mentioned.
Personal details that could lead to the identiﬁcation of the participants have moreover
been omitted.
Participants’ background and characteristics
All the participants included in this study had been part of homegrown extremist milieus
which shared ISIS perspectives and objectives, approved its methodology (at least to
a certain extent) and had exported a number of foreign ﬁghters since the outbreak of the
Syrian war. Four participants had become involved in these milieus prior to the Syrian war,
while the vast majority had joined at a later stage. Consistent with previous studies,
participants reported a combination of “push” and “pull” factors for becoming involved in
extremist groups. These “push” and “pull” factors included a need for meaning and personal
signiﬁcance, a search for a stable identity, dissatisfaction with Western policies and inter-
ventions in Muslim countries, personal and social grievances, as well as socialization
processes.35 Although the majority of participants did not physically take part in the
armed struggle—with the exception of one female participant who had traveled to Iraq in
2015—they all reported having supported the establishment of a Caliphate in Iraq and Syria,
yet to varying degrees. While more than half of the participants considered ISIS to be the
only legitimate jihadi group worldwide, a minority had conversely chosen to not take a side
in the ideological conﬂict between ISIS and Al Qaeda. Eight participants additionally
reported during interviews to have actively looked into possible ways to travel to Iraq and
Syria to ﬁght alongside ISIS but to have abandoned their plans due to prosecution and
surveillance, or to ﬁnancial obstacles. Three participants conversely considered armed jihad
to not be an obligation and had instead chosen to focus on activism in their home country.
Only one participant had traveled to Iraq but minimized her involvement with ISIS. Despite
these diﬀerences, all the participants had been involved in some forms of support activities,
ranging from propaganda and recruitment to ﬁnancial and moral support. Overall, they
reported that being part of extremist milieus had provided them with a context and rationale
for personal and social transformations and had contributed to their self-concept.
Limitations
Before proceeding further, several methodological limitations should be mentioned. The
ﬁrst limitation concerns the period around which data were collected. In the majority of
cases, interviews took place between January and September 2018, a period during which
ISIS had already suﬀered numerous territorial defeats but was still active in some parts of
the Euphrates river and Anbar area. While some participants had already started distan-
cing themselves from ISIS, the majority continued to express their support for the group.
Given the recent military defeat of ISIS in Baghuz in March 2019, it would have been
valuable to conduct follow-up interviews to examine whether these developments had had
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any implications on participants’ commitment. In most cases, this was however not
possible. A second limitation concerns diﬃculties in gaining access to individuals who
were still ﬁghting alongside ISIS or had surrendered to opposition forces. Although some
interviews were conducted with relatives of foreign ﬁghters, no direct contact was estab-
lished with individuals who were still in Iraq and Syria. This contribution thus mainly
focuses on sympathizers who have stayed in their home country. A third limitation is
related to internal validity. Because this study draws on personal accounts, it ﬁrst and
foremost relies on narratives of past and present involvement. While there are a number
of values in using personal accounts—namely, that it provides a glimpse into individuals’
lifeworld and the meaning they ascribe to their experience—it is at the same time
important to mention that the production of narratives is inﬂuenced by a number of
factors such as the positionality of the one who speaks and the one who listens, what
participants decide to disclose or to conceal, the meaning they give to their past experi-
ences, as well as social desirability.36 One can for instance think about several reasons for
which a former ISIS supporter may attempt to minimize his or her past involvement when
interacting with outsiders (e.g. social desirability, stigma, etc.). Personal accounts should
consequently be read as internal truths rather than factual accounts.37 Last but not least, it
should be mentioned that given the qualitative nature of the present study and the limited
sample of participants interviewed by the author, conclusions are ﬁrst and foremost
exploratory. Nevertheless, the data provides a valuable preliminary empirical look into
some supporters’ responses to the fall of the Caliphate, a topic which has so far been
underexplored.
Making sense of the fall of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria: Belief reaﬃrmation
and disengagement
The interviews on which this study is based revealed a contrasted picture of jihadi
supporters’ responses to the demise of the Caliphate. At the time the interviews were
conducted, ISIS had already suﬀered signiﬁcant territorial defeats and was on the verge of
collapse. Yet, more than half of the participants continued to commit to ISIS’s ideology.
Although they acknowledged that ISIS had faced a number of territorial setbacks, they
interpreted these territorial losses in a way that reaﬃrmed their belief system and justiﬁed
their sustained commitment to the group. Only a minority distanced themselves from ISIS
and minimized their past support for the group. Data indicated that for these participants,
dissonance had often preceded the fall of the Caliphate. The following subsections will
further examine how participants coped with the demise of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria
by outlining two main responses: (1) belief reaﬃrmation, and (2) disengagement. The last
subsection will further explain these diﬀerences by developing on the role of belief system,
self-concept, and disillusionment in participants’ responses.
Belief reaﬃrmation
You know what they say … baqiya [remaining and expanding].38
This was Mourad’s ﬁrst response when asked about the demise of the Caliphate in Iraq
and Syria during an interview in February 2019. According to Mourad, the territorial
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losses ISIS had suﬀered since 2015 only constituted a minor setback in ISIS’s ideological
project. In fact, he argued that the establishment of a Caliphate in Iraq and Syria had never
been a central aspect of ISIS’s ambitions. Instead, he stressed the widespread support that
ISIS had garnered worldwide and overemphasized local achievements and victories. Such
an argument is illustrative of how most participants interpreted and made sense of the
demise of the Caliphate. While they acknowledged that ISIS had suﬀered a number of
territorial setbacks, they at the same time trivialized the relevance of the Caliphate,
spiritualized ISIS’s territorial defeat and/or ﬁltered out information that conﬂicted with
their claim that a victory was near. According to them, ISIS would remain and expand.
Consistent with CDT, most participants interpreted the fall of the Caliphate in a way
that reaﬃrmed their belief system and justiﬁed their commitment to the group. As a form
of cognitive resistance, belief reaﬃrmation entails a reinterpretation of reality so that it
conforms to individuals’ belief system. Such a dissonance reducing process is more likely
to occur when individuals attach high importance value to the cognition under threat.39
As Dalgaard-Nielsen argues, “people strive to see themselves, and to appear to others, as
consistent and competent and harbor a dislike against going through a potentially painful
and disorienting process of restructuring ideas and values that are closely tied up with
their identity, life, and life-choices.”40 When confronted with inconsistencies, individuals
will consequently seek to reduce dissonance by altering facts, information or events that
conﬂict with their beliefs.41 Among participants, this manifested in two ways: on the
discursive level through the reinterpretation of the demise of the Caliphate, and on the
behavioral level through sustained commitment to support activities and proselytism.
The ﬁrst set of techniques—discursive practices—may be described as both a self-
aﬃrmation and impression-management technique.42 By reinterpreting the fall of the
Caliphate, participants both conﬁrmed their self-concept to themselves and others, gave
meaning to their past and present commitment, and portrayed their faith as unshaken. At
the same time, diﬀerences were observed in the type of discursive techniques participants
employed. Like Mourad, most participants acknowledged that ISIS had experienced
territorial setbacks but either altered the relevance of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria
and/or over-emphasized ISIS’s widespread support and anticipated the role that ISIS
supporters and returning ﬁghters could play in exporting global jihadism in their home
countries. As Mourad further explained “when [ISIS ﬁghters] will be arrested, they will go
to prison in their country and the ideology will spread even more than when it was
concealed to Syria. So I don’t know if you can see it as a win or as a defeat. Because ﬁrst it
was contained in a place and now it will spread everywhere. You cannot have control over
thousands of people, over the children … they have it ﬁrmly to their heart. Even the
Yazidi children.”43 Several participants additionally stressed the role that local jihadi
groups could play in reestablishing a physical Caliphate in ISIS’s provinces. They thus
restored consistency by minimizing the conﬂicting aspects of their belief system—such as
prophetic traditions and territorial expansion in the Levant—and over-emphasizing the
more tangible aspects of ISIS’s ideology such as worldwide mobilization, local alliances
and victories. Two participants additionally reinterpreted territorial losses as a test of faith.
For these participants, the revival of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria had been a central
aspect of ISIS’s ideological project. At the same time, they minimized its demise by
interpreting territorial losses as partial fulﬁllment of ISIS’s prophetic ambitions. As
Johan, for instance, explained when asked about the fall of the Caliphate:
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It is indeed a huge trial from Allah, Allah tests who are the sincere ones with huge calamities,
it is to clear the ranks to prepare for an upcoming huge victory (…) If Dawla [ISIS] was
strong and everyone joined and went we wouldn’t know munaﬁq [hypocrite] from the
truthful so Allah strikes with the calamities ‘cause the munaﬁqeen [hypocrites] can’t hold.
But the few sincere ones will be ﬁrm. If you look closely this will be the case. There is a huge
victory coming by the will of Allah and the more the calamity intensiﬁes the nearer is
victory.44
In Johan’s view, the territorial losses ISIS had suﬀered ﬁrst and foremost aimed to
distinguish weak believers from the faithful ones. He thus rationalized the demise of the
Caliphate by ascribing divine meaning to territorial setbacks. Melton identiﬁes such
dissonance reducing process as “spiritualization,” a process consisting of apprehending
dissonant shreds of evidence as if they had a divine meaning or spiritual function.45 One
obvious merit of spiritualization is that it makes believers’ worldview immune to dis-
conﬁrmation. Any conﬂicting fact or information is reinterpreted as part of a cosmic
realm and thus as a conﬁrmation of individuals’ belief systems. Moreover, it allowed
participants to rationalize defection among ISIS ﬁghters. Jaap, a twenty years-old convert,
for instance claimed that many foreign ﬁghters were not ideologically driven but were
motivated by the social and material rewards of membership, including accommodation,
marriage, ﬁnancial compensation and the spoils of war.46 Like Johan, he believed that the
territorial setbacks ISIS has suﬀered since 2015 served to purge and purify ISIS’s ranks in
preparation for a ﬁnal victory. As he explained, “Islam began as something strange and it
will return to being something strange as it ﬁrst began, so glad tidings to the strangers.”47
Spiritualizing ISIS’s defeat thus allowed participants to reaﬃrm their belief system and to
at the same time rationalize the investments they had made for the group by establishing
a clear boundary between “true believers” and “hypocrites.”
The ascription of divine meaning to territorial losses moreover indicated that participants
were able to draw on the broader context of their faith to reduce dissonance in the face of
ISIS’s imminent defeat. As Geelhoed argues, the idea of being tested through hardship,
suﬀering, and tribulations is an inherent aspect of Islamic belief: the more one suﬀers, the
stronger one is in the eyes of God.48 Dawson moreover stresses the “supply of rationaliza-
tions available in the rich heritage of the Qur’an, Hadith, and history of Islam” and the tools
it provides to spiritualize territorial losses.49 Participants moreover referred to the broader
vocabulary of motives deployed in ISIS’s propaganda. Shaﬃr describes a vocabulary of
motives as a set of dissonance-reducing techniques provided by cultic milieus to prepare
their followers for prophetic disconﬁrmation.50 Developed on the organizational level and
learned through socialization, these dissonance-reducing techniques constitute an integral
part of the cognitive framework which individuals acquire during membership in cultic
milieus.51 Similar to cultic milieus, ISIS has developed a vocabulary of motives to prepare its
followers for a potential defeat. In an article entitled Apocalypse Delayed, McCants for
instance noted that ISIS leaders started in 2015 to downplay the signiﬁcance of Dabiq,
a village in Northern Syria where the great ﬁnal battle was predicted to occur, as airstrikes
intensiﬁed and the group’s conﬁdence declined.52 In 2016, following several symbolic
defeats, ISIS media oﬃcials released a newsletter to announce that the battle of Dabiq was
in fact not the ﬁnal battle mentioned in Islamic traditions. Lakomy similarly stresses the use
of damage control techniques in ISIS’s propaganda magazine Rumiyah.53 Ranging from
concealing defeats to overemphasizing military victories in ISIS’s provinces, these techniques
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have served to minimize the impact of its defeat and sustain supporters’ commitment. The
fact that some participants used similar rationalization techniques during interviews seems
to conﬁrm Dawson’s prediction that “the exegetical resourcefulness of the movement’s
ideologues, and the group’s revolutionary exploitation of the internet and other new social
media” will continue to provide suﬃcient motivation and inspiration for its supporters.54
Interestingly enough, two participants reaﬃrmed their belief system by engaging in
rhetoric of denial and ﬁltering information about the demise of the Caliphate. For these
participants, media coverage about ISIS’s defeat was part of a Western propaganda
campaign which aimed at discrediting ISIS’s achievements and deterring potential muja-
hidin (ﬁghters) from migrating to Iraq and Syria. Sally, a twenty-two year-old convert
from the Netherlands, for instance claimed that life in the Caliphate remained idyllic and
continued to attract a number of foreign ﬁghters willing to contribute to its expansion.55
These participants supported their rhetoric of denial with references to alternative sources
deemed more reliable than Western media and through selective information processing.
During interviews, they for instance primarily referred to propaganda content produced
between 2013 and 2015. This ranged from videos celebrating the establishment of the
Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, anasheed (Islamic hymns) calling for hijra (migration to
Islamic lands), outdated images of poster boys who were no longer alive, and to utopian
accounts of women who had traveled to Iraq and Syria after the proclamation of the
Caliphate. This choice of propaganda, along with the rhetoric of denial these participants
engaged in, suggested that they sustained their belief-system through the construction of
a cognitive bubble rooted in past narratives of success. While the data did not allow for the
drawing of conclusions on why these participants engaged in denial, it could be argued
that ISIS’s vocabulary of motives was either ineﬀective in reducing the dissonance they
experienced, or that they were most cognitively aﬀected by the fall of the physical
Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Overall, it echoes Festinger’s argument that to eﬀectively
reduce or eliminate dissonance, individuals may go as far as blinding themselves to the
fact that their expectations have not been met.56
In addition to reinterpreting ISIS’s defeat, participants reaﬃrmed their belief system by
behaviorally committing to support activities and adopting new roles. These support
activities ranged from moral and ﬁnancial support to proselytism and propaganda.
Clara, a twenty-two years old convert who had temporarily abandoned her plans to
migrate to ISIS territories, had started organizing underground lectures to consolidate
homegrown support in Belgium and the Netherlands. According to Clara, a number of
homegrown supporters had left her network over the past two years to join Madkhalist
groups, a quietist strain of Salaﬁsm that advocates for personal piety and that sanctions the
use of violence as well as rebellion against Muslim rulers. Clara ascribed disengagement
among her former peers to their limited Islamic knowledge and their weak faith. She had
consequently started to give lectures on the danger of taghut (worshipping idols other
than Allah) and on the practice of takﬁr (excommunication of Muslims committing
apostasy) and was simultaneously involved in a number of support activities for impri-
soned peers and their families. Jaap, who had previously worked as a translator for pro-
ISIS Telegram channels, had shifted toward da’wah (missionary) activities and had created
a platform for spreading “true Islam” in online and oﬄine settings. While he did not
openly call for violence during his missionary activities, he stressed the importance of
physical jihad in his online videos. These various activities were perceived among
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participants as more beneﬁcial to the jihadi community than joining the armed struggle,
for it exposed individuals to the risk of being captured or killed by opposition forces.
Festinger moreover notes that sustained involvement in proselytism can serve to conﬁrm
the faith that one has in his or her belief system and the truth of its teaching in the
aftermath of disconﬁrmation.57 By voicing their belief to others and sustaining their
behavioral commitment, individuals portray their faith as unshaken and immune to
changes in circumstances.58 The adoption of new supportive roles thus constitutes
a fundamental part of the dissonance reducing processes participants engaged in to
reaﬃrm their belief in the wake of ISIS’s defeat.
Disengagement
While most participants reinterpreted the demise of the Caliphate in a way that reaﬃrmed
their commitment to the group, four conversely perceived ISIS’s territorial losses as a clear
sign that the revolution in Iraq and Syria had come to a standstill. For these participants,
the demise of the Caliphate did not only constitute a signiﬁcant ideological setback for
ISIS but also for global jihadism in general. On the one hand, they stressed jihadi groups’
failure to overthrow the Assad government and to reestablish Sharia in Iraq and Syria,
which they attributed to both Western intervention in the Syrian war and to the increasing
ﬁtna (division) in the jihadi scene. In their view, most jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria had
been motivated by worldly interests, which had contributed to increasing conﬂicts and
eventually to territorial losses. Several participants moreover reported having started
questioning the eﬀectiveness of armed jihad and the adapted methods to establish an
Islamic State. Overall, they expressed a sense of uncertainty toward jihadi groups’ ability to
regain territories in Iraq and Syria and to bring the armed conﬂict toward a positive
outcome.
While the data indicated that participants experienced dissonance, it is important to note
that the majority had started disengaging before the fall of the Caliphate. First coined by
Horgan, disengagement can be deﬁned as ceasing or reducing involvement in activities
associated with extremism, either because individuals abandon the norms, values, and orien-
tations forged during membership and/or because they shift toward new roles that minimize
their involvement in extremism.59 In this contribution it refers to a declining commitment to
ideological groups’ belief systems as a result of dissonance.60 Data indicated that like belief
reaﬃrmation, disengagement among participants had both a discursive and behavioral
dimension. On the discursive level, disengagement notably manifested through participants’
condemnation of ISIS’s methods and through their reinterpretation of what “doing jihad”
meant. In some cases, participants additionally reframed their past commitment by minimiz-
ing their involvement in supportive milieus and by stressing diﬀerences between their current
belief system and ISIS’s frame of reference. On the behavioral level, a reduced commitment to
support activities, along with a gradual reorientation toward more conventional forms of
social involvement, weremoreover observed. Inmost cases, these changes in commitment had
preceded the demise of the Caliphate. Several participants for instancementioned a number of
personal and organizational factors that had contributed to an alteration of their belief system
and self-concept, and a reassessment of the costs and beneﬁts of their involvement in
extremism. On the organizational level, they mentioned a sense of discrepancy between
their own values and ISIS’s methods. In particular, they questioned the killing of Sunni
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Muslims, the orchestration of attacks in theWest and the atrocities ISIS had engaged in. Some
participants additionally reported to have experienced some initial doubts toward ISIS’s
prophetic legitimacy and to have maintained a bystander position in the escalating conﬂict
between ISIS and Al Qaeda. On the personal level, prosecution, incarceration, disillusionment
with activism’s lack of eﬀectiveness, motherhood/fatherhood, as well as a change in priority,
seemed to have acted as contributing factors to disengagement.61 Rather than triggering
dissonance, it is thus more accurate to say that the demise of the Caliphate had reinforced
participants’ ongoing sense of disillusionment. As one participant, Paul, for instance
explained:
I did not fully believe in the rise of an Islamic State and now I know why […] It rose so
quickly that everyone knew you cannot manage such an enormous amount of territory. It’s
not sustainable. And they wanted [to expand] because it was one way to prove they were
right. “Look we are so quick because we are on the winning side now.” But I think it’s not
sustainable. It’s a bubble.62
Paul consequently interpreted the demise of the Caliphate as a conﬁrmation of his initial
doubts toward ISIS’s ability to sustain a Caliphate. Another participant, Abdul, alterna-
tively attributed territorial losses to ISIS’s “communist and atheist leadership” which had
used a “coat of Islamic appearance” to mobilize support.63 While he claimed to have
warned jihadi supporters against the unislamic character of ISIS from the moment it had
established its Caliphate, his past online activities however indicated that he had for a long
time supported ISIS. When confronted about these inconsistencies, he explained that “I
think [that by ﬂirting with jihadi milieus] I was trying to portray myself as someone cool,
like ‘look at me’. When you are young, you like the attention […] but I was not a real
jihadist in the sense that I have never been interested in weapons or ﬁghting.”64 He thus
minimized his support for the group by attributing his involvement in extremism to his
craving for attention. Miriam, who had returned to Europe after the fall of Mosul,
similarly minimized her past support for ISIS by claiming that she had initially traveled
to Iraq to visit some family members.65 While the data did not allow for the drawing of
conclusions on whether participants had indeed experienced initial doubts or were rather
motivated by social desirability (or both), they seemed to no longer perceive the identity
they derived from their involvement in extremist milieus as desirable, either because they
did not identify anymore with ISIS’s norms and values or because the demise of the
Caliphate made ISIS membership far less attractive.66 Claiming to have experienced
doubts at the same time allowed them to morally disengage from ISIS’s actions and
methods, and thus to present themselves in a way that was more acceptable to outsiders
(and potentially more consistent with their present self-concept).67
While participants reported having experienced initial doubts toward ISIS’s legitimacy,
they at the same time continued to adhere to jihadi ideals. All of the participants for
instanced believed that governance through Sharia would beneﬁt Muslims as well as non-
Muslims, and that defensive jihad was permissible under certain conditions. Yet, they
claimed that the current situation in Iraq and Syria had led them to question whether the
use of force was the most eﬀective means to establish an Islamic state and implement
Sharia. In addition, several participants reported having started reconsidering the costs
and beneﬁts of their involvement in subversive actions. This reassessment often resulted
from a combination of factors that preceded the demise of the Caliphate and notably
12 L. E. J. S. MASSÉ
included incarceration, prosecution and counter-terrorism crackdowns on supportive
milieus. As Abdul for instance explained:
I am more careful now with what I say, I try to focus on my life. Before I was more carefree,
but now I don’t try to get involved with anything because I have seen what it brought [to be
involved in activism]. I had to stop with my studies and focus on defending myself and of
course I have to work to earn a living.68
Paul similarly associated his withdrawal from subversive actions to prosecution and to his
disillusionment with activism:
I think the activism has died inside me. At the moment I was doing it, I think it was good in
the sense that I still agree with the principles and the topics we raised, I think the Muslim
community is still being marginalized and discriminated […] but if you look at it practically,
does [activism] really help? Will it really change something? Is it worth the eﬀort? Well
I think a lot of Salaﬁsts would say that it’s about the eﬀort, because you are rewarded for the
eﬀorts, not for the outcome, so yes, it’s worth it but I think I could use the time for other
things, like studying … [And] I think it’s also because of the trial. If you are [incarcerated for
your ideas], at some point you are like ‘well I will try everything to not come back here’. In
this sense prison helped [to change my approach] because it’s just not worth it.69
Both Abdul and Paul reported a sense of disillusionment with activism as a result of
prosecution and the limited eﬀectiveness of their subversive actions. Miriam alternatively
stressed motherhood and the intensiﬁcation of airstrikes in Iraq as the main reasons for
coming back to Europe.70 These factors appeared to have led to a change in priority and
a reconsideration of their modes of action. Following his release, Paul had withdrawn
from subversive actions and had shifted toward more legitimate forms of involvement in
public debates which, in his view, allowed him to contribute more eﬀectively to the
Muslim community. Abdul had started considering entering politics to contribute to
social debates on Islam. According to Whalen and Flacks, such reorientation toward
more conventional forms of social involvement does not necessarily represent a rupture
in former activists’ trajectory but rather a next step in “moral career”:71 just like involve-
ment in extremism had provided participants with the feeling that they were actively
involved in social changes, their reorientation toward more socially acceptable careers
allowed them to conciliate their ideological convictions with their changes in priority and
their search for a more stable future. Jeroen and Miriam had conversely shifted toward
inner jihad, that was, bettering themselves as Muslims, which in their current view
constituted a precondition for social changes. As Jeroen explained, “if you want to change
society, you ﬁrst need to change your own house, that is what Allah said to the Muslims.
Start with your own house. You cannot change the world if inside you are not a good
person.”72
Participants’ apparent changing views on how they could best beneﬁt the Muslim
community overall indicated an attempt to redeﬁne what “doing jihad” meant in the
light of their disillusionment with jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria and their involvement in
extremism. While they previously conceived armed struggle and subversive actions as the
only possible means to achieve far-reaching changes in society, the ineﬀectiveness of ISIS’s
tactics and supportive milieus’ actions had led them to reconsider their own modes of
actions and to shift toward more conventional resources. These included working on
improving their relations with non-Muslims to positively inﬂuence their view on Islam,
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pursuing their education and conducting research, and participating in public and poli-
tical debates. These alternatives allowed participants to remain actively involved in social
changes and at the same time focus on other aspects of their lives such as their family or
their professional development. This in turn allowed them to restore consistency between
their behavior and their changing attitudes toward jihadism. Overall, the data indicated
that the demise of the Caliphate had only had a limited impact on participants’ ongoing
disengagement.
Explaining diﬀerences in adaptive responses
So far, this contribution has attempted to delineate the implications of ISIS’s territorial
defeat on jihadi supporters’ commitment by examining how participants have perceived
and responded to the demise of the physical Caliphate in Iraq and Syria. As it has become
clear, participants either responded to the demise of the Caliphate by reaﬃrming their
commitment to the group or conversely distanced themselves from the group. This
subsection aims to further explain these diﬀerences by examining the inﬂuence of personal
and situational factors on participants’ responses.
Despite the restricted sample examined in this study, some tentative observations can
be made. A ﬁrst observation concerns the degree to which participants have been
socialized into ISIS’s ideology and have been committed to engaging in costly investments
for the realization of its Caliphate. A comparison of participants’ proﬁles indicated that
those who engaged in belief reaﬃrmation in the wake of ISIS’s defeat tended to associate
jihadism with ISIS’s ideology. These participants had for the majority converted to
jihadism during the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and under the inﬂuence
of pro-ISIS networks, which had contributed to shaping their interpretation of jihadi
principles and doctrine. Participants who distanced themselves from ISIS conversely
perceived its ideology as an interpretation of jihadi principles. While ISIS’s ideology had
inﬂuenced their belief system, they attached less importance to the realization of its
Caliphate. Moreover, they were more likely to report discrepancies between their own
moral values and ISIS’s methods. In addition, diﬀerences were observed in participants’
degree of commitment to the group. Those who attached less importance to the realization
of the Caliphate had for the majority chosen to remain in their home country during the
Syrian war—with the exception of Miriam who had traveled to Iraq. Although they
reported having supported the armed struggle in Iraq and Syria, they claimed to perceive
themselves as “men of words” rather than “men of actions.” As Paul explained, “I was not
into militancy, I was more into activism. I wasn’t thinking about using violence, and
traveling to a war zone, not knowing what would happen, that’s not something that
interested me. Activism was enough for me, we can change a lot in society here.”73 Miriam
had traveled to Iraq but came back to Europe after the fall of Mosul; like Paul, she
reported not being ready to sacriﬁce herself for ISIS’s cause. Participants who remained
committed to the group conversely claimed that their decision to not join the armed
struggle was involuntary and stressed a number of factors that had prevented them from
traveling to ISIS areas. Not being able to physically take part in the armed struggle
moreover seemed to have exacerbated their idealization of the Islamic State and their
commitment to the group. These participants were indeed more likely to interpret ISIS’s
defeat as a test of faith, to over-emphasize its victory, and to attribute defection among
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ISIS ﬁghters and supporters to their weak faith. These diﬀerences seem to indicate both
divergences in participants’ belief system and their level of commitment.
A second observation concerns the degree to which participants have derived their self-
concept from membership in supportive milieus. Consistent with CDT, the data indicated
that participants who engaged in belief reaﬃrmation tended to align their self-concept on
the supportive milieus they were part of. Several participants had broken ties with their
family members and their previous environment, had dropped out of school or had left
their job shortly after becoming involved in extremism. In addition, they reported to
primarily interact with like-minded peers and to restrict their contacts with outsiders. As
Moghaddam notes in his study on RAF members, isolation from wider society can play an
important role in sheltering individuals from the wider world and in sustaining their
loyalty to the group in the wake of a defeat.74 All of them were moreover monitored for
their involvement in homegrown extremist groups, which restricted their access to
employment and reinforced their sense of grievance and victimhood. Social isolation
and unemployment also meant that they were less likely to foresee meaningful alternatives
to their current membership. According to Rumelili, this can motivate individuals to
perpetuate the conﬂicts on which their self-concept and sense of certainty rest.75 As she
notes, conﬂicts “help contain existential anxieties respectively by establishing deﬁnite
objects of fear, producing systems of meaning that clearly diﬀerentiate friends from
enemies, and setting unequivocal moral standards premised on the necessity for
survival.”76 Conﬂict resolutions, organizational changes in circumstances or military
defeats conversely threaten individuals’ sense of certainty for it requires ﬂexibility, as
well as a redeﬁnition of both the identity of the self and others.77 Individuals must rethink
their everyday life and their future, what they will do and what they will be in the absence
of a cause to live for. This situation can induce anxiety and motivates individuals to
sustain their commitment to the group on which their self-concept rests. Last but not
least, participants reported a negative public perception of (former) ISIS members, which
seemed to exacerbate the dichotomous thinking of “us” versus “them.” As Decker and
Lauritsen note in their research on desistance among gang members, continuing to be
perceived and treated as members of a devalued group may convince individuals that
exiting the group is not worth the eﬀort and lead to an increase in group commitment.78
Extremist milieus conversely provided participants with a valorized identity, a community
of belonging, a cause and purpose to live for, as well as a meaningful narrative to orientate
themselves in the world. The existential and social rewards they derived from member-
ship, along with the (real or perceived) obstacles they faced outside of supportive milieus,
may consequently explain why they were more likely to reinterpret the demise of the
Caliphate in a way that reaﬃrmed their beliefs and sustained their commitment.79 Those
who distanced themselves from ISIS conversely seemed to have maintained some critical
distance toward jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria and to have continued investing in their
education and professional career during their involvement in extremism. They moreover
stressed the negative impacts that their involvement in extremism had had on their social
identity and personal life. Last but least, they reported moral discrepancies between their
own personal values and ISIS’s methods. As previously mentioned, these factors seemed to
have led participants to redeﬁne some aspects of their self-concept and belief system, as
well as their priorities. The above observations overall stress diﬀerences in the degree to
which participants have derived their belief system and self-concept from ISIS ideology at
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the time of its defeat. Consistent with CDT, the data indicated that the more participants
derived their self-concept and belief system from ISIS’s ideology, the more likely they were
to engage in belief reaﬃrmation in the wake of ISIS’s defeat and to remain committed to
the group.80 Conversely, the less value they attached to ISIS’s ideological project, the more
likely they were to distance themselves from the group.
Conclusion
In an article anticipating the demise of ISIS’s Caliphate, Dawson observed that prophecies
“are invariably less important to the day-to-day lives of believers than outsiders tend to
think … The social and spiritual rewards of being in the group surpass the costs of the
speciﬁc failure, and the ridicule of outsiders often serves to reinforce the conviction they
are part of the elect, the blessed few who see the truth and are destined for greater
things.”81 Thus “if Abū Bakr al Baghdadi, or a legitimate successor, can continue to
successfully communicate with the rank and ﬁle of IS and its vast network of supporters
around the world, supplying them with a plausible rationale for the unexpected twist of
fate IS has experienced, then there is a strong likelihood that IS will survive the demise of
the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.”82 The accounts of jihadi supporters examined in this
contribution largely conﬁrm Dawson’s prediction. While the data indicated that
a minority of participants had started disengaging prior to the fall of the Caliphate, the
majority continued to commit to ISIS and expressed an unshaken faith in their belief
system. As it has been argued, these diﬀerences in participants’ responses can be attributed
to several personal and situational factors. These included the degree to which individuals
were committed to ISIS’s ideological project and willing to engage in costly investments
on the behalf of the group; the degree to which they derived their belief system from ISIS’s
ideology; and the degree to which they derived their self-concept from identiﬁcation with
ISIS and their membership in supportive milieus. The more individuals identiﬁed with
ISIS at the time of its defeat, the more likely they were to engage in belief reaﬃrmation.
Overall, the social and existential rewards they derived from membership were suﬃcient
reasons to remain committed to the group in the wake of its defeat. Conversely, the less
central ISIS’s ideology was to individuals’ self-concept and belief-system, the more likely
they were to alter their attitude and behavior when confronted with personal changes in
circumstances (incarceration, prosecution, negative experiences with an extremist mode of
life) and ideological setbacks. Given the fact that most participants continued to be
committed to ISIS, it may be expected that ISIS’s military defeat will only have a limited
impact on supportive milieus. While its global appeal may be reduced among those
experiencing doubts toward the legitimacy of its violent methods and ideology, it is likely
that a majority of “genuine believers” will continue to ﬁnd certainty, meaning, belonging
and purpose in ISIS’s supportive milieus.
On a more theoretical level, this contribution has shown that applying cognitive
dissonance theory to the study of radicalization and terrorism can provide a more
nuanced understanding of how supporters respond to speciﬁc situations such as orga-
nizational changes in circumstances, perceived discrepancy between their own moral
values and the norms of the group they adhere to, military defeats and the like. With its
focus on cognitive adaptability, cognitive dissonance links threats to one’s belief system
and self-concept with cognitive and behavioral responses, and thus provides an
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analytical tool for understanding extremism in context. Moreover, it can shed light on
why some individuals disengage from extremism while others remain committed to the
group.
Finally, this paper also has implications for counter-extremism programs (CVE). Given
the fact that individuals tend to respond to counter-attitudinal messages by increasing
their commitment to their belief-system, it is likely that CVE programs that focus on
countering individuals’ beliefs will be met with resistance unless individuals are already in
a phase of doubt.83 The data at the same time suggests that the presence of meaningful
alternatives to extremism—in particular via more conventional forms of being involved in
social change—can facilitate role change and disengagement. As shown in this contribu-
tion, shifting toward more conventional forms of social involvement allowed disillusioned
participants to conciliate their ideological and personal convictions with their changes in
priority while at the same time contributing to their redeﬁnition of what “doing jihad”
meant. To promote exit from extremism, CVE programs should consequently limit
counter-narrative and counter-ideology interventions to instead focus on social reintegra-
tion, as well as social and aﬀective bonds. Greater attention should additionally be paid to
militant groups’ supportive environment. While governments’ crackdown on supportive
milieus is likely to result in further support for militancy, focusing on social cohesion and
on bridging ties between supportive milieus and wider society may conversely encourage
dialogue and prevent the escalation of conﬂicts.84 A relevant question for counter-
terrorism debates should therefore not solely be that of whether jihadi supporters may
continue to pose a threat to international security; instead, it is necessary to examine how
society currently addresses supporters’ grievances and what kinds of prospects it oﬀers
them to construct a sense of certainty, meaning, and purpose outside of extremism.
Without addressing such questions, it is likely that militant groups—whether religiously-
inspired or secular—will continue to attract a number of young people and pose a risk to
domestic and international security in the future.
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